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Abstract:  
 
This study has a major motivation to empirically find the fundamentals of budget deficit 
instability for the period 1984 to 2016 using panel data set of low and high income countries. 
All the countries included in the study are reported in the international monetary fund (IMF) 
Government financial statistic (GFS) and World Bank member countries.This study has tried 
to empirically evaluate the economic and political sources of budget deficit volatility.  
 
This study has tried to empirically evaluate the economic and political sources of budget 
deficit volatility. This study first estimate the regression model by considering the panel 
characteristics of the data set and estimate the fixed effects and random effects models. 
Finally Hausman test is used to make a decision for the best fit model. 
 
According to present study institutional variables are very important determinants of budget 
deficit, both in the regions of low and high income countries. The outcome indicates that the 
budget is more stable with the higher level of political stability. The Budget deficit has more 
fluctuations if higher level of corruption coexists.  
 
This study contributes to the literature for institutional setup  and budget deficit and reached 
to the conclusion that to avoid high and unstable deficit attention should be diverted to 
improve institutional setup of the economy.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The developed and developing countries have a crucial challenge of persistently 
increasing budget deficits and its volatility for numerous reasons. First, enormous 
deficit instability is a failure of fiscal policy because it becomes impossible to 
suggest at what time and degree of fiscal policy be implement and this leads to 
become decision making ineffi cient. Second, government spending volatility may 
be a consequence of the budget deficit instability and the distortions in the form of 
wasteful spending made by short-term methods to encounter these variations in 
expenditure. Third, high budget deficit volatility may also be a reason for capital 
loss in the form of short term investment projects. In modern times the degree of 
government budget deficits and debt became the most prominent issues in 
economics on which a lot of discussions are made. Instable fiscal deficits may be 
damaging to social welfare because past literature has widely shown that fiscal debt 
is negatively associated with the long run fiscal balance of the economy so future 
generation may suffer very easily (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Woo, 1996; Alesina 
and Rodrik, 1994 and Persson and Tabellini, 1994). In the earlier times budget 
deficits were considered only as an economic issue but beginning of political 
economics in 1980s gave a realization to researchers to observe this subject both 
from viewpoints of economic and political perspective.  
 
After the first oil crisis in 1973 many industrialized countries had been facing the 
problem of significant high budget deficits and interesting is the fact even in the 
prosperous years countries were facing problem of budget deficit when there was 
high growth of income whereas according to the economic theory the deficits should 
be low during the time when there is high economic growth. As a result, in the times 
of high economic growth the magnitude of debt have been accumulated 
progressively, and more interesting  is the fact, even countries are facing similar 
economic shocks, the amount of  deficits and debt varying in magnitude as vary the 
number of country. The key emphasis of the current study is to empirically examine 
the foundations of deficit volatility for low and high income countries using panel 
data for the period 1984 to 2016. The present study is focusing on the economic 
political and institutional factors that cause instability in budget deficits. The current 
study also draws attention of the economists towards effects of trade openness and 
inflation on budget deficit instability. The analysis includes the impact of political 
instability on the budget deficit instability. The current study is arranged as follows. 
The theoretical and empirical overview on this area presents in Section 2. Section 3 
presents the methodology and data. The empirical results are discussed in section 4 
and last section concludes the study. 
 
2. An Overview of the Budget Defict Framework  
 
The topic of budget instability is very broad because the literature can be considered 
according to various political variables. In the recent times the description of 
particular political explanatory variables e.g. political stability, size of government, 
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fragmentation of government, type of budgetary procedures, negotiation power of 
unions etc. has received substantial consideration (Roubini and Sachs (1989) and De 
Haan and Sturm (1994). The budget deficit and surpluses may help to minimize 
spending and revenue shock if tax rate is constant over time Barro (1979) and Lucas 
and Stokey (1983). Over the last thirty years majority of developed and developing 
countries are facing persistence rise of fiscal deficits.  Many countries are facing a 
major challenge in the form of damages of high fiscal deficit and its volatility. The 
subject of budget deficit and its determinants is widely theoretically and empirically 
studied. Nevertheless, A lot of efforts still required in the area of instability of 
budget deficit. The current section analyses few significant studies on this subject of 
interest. The association of political variables and fiscal response found in Person 
(2001) and Person and Tabellin (2001). The evidence is also found for low anti 
cyclical fiscal policy in electoral years Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) and Sorensen 
et al.(2001). Governments determine both debt and future entitlements Bouton, 
Lizzeri and Persico (2017). While Alesina and Drazen (1989) highlight that political 
fragmentation is a reason of high cost and delayed fiscal implementation of rules. 
Tabellini and Alesina (1990) show that parties have excessive spending if they risk 
losing the elections. Lizzeri (1999) also describes that competition of political party 
results in fiscal deficit. Azzimonti, Battaglini and Coate (2016) have given a recent 
analysis of legal methods to handle unnecessary deficits constructed on the dynamic 
judicial bargaining model in Butters and Coate (2008). 
 
Azzimonti, Battaglini and Coate (2016) claim that short run costs and long run 
benefits are associated with balanced budget rule and it may offset costs of fiscal 
deficit. According to economists remarkably high fiscal deficits are permissible only 
if are supported by a parliament Supermajority. The same argument is also 
supported by Becker, Gersbach, and Grimm (2010). Gruner.(2017) also  paid 
attention on public expenditure decisions of fiscal policymakers and on political 
parties bargain for budget. Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b) gave a stress to association 
between fiscal deficit and the fragmentation with positive relationship. Edin and 
Ohlsson (1994) disclose that this conclusion provided by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 
b) may be a consequence of classification and measurement of the variable because 
it captures government fragmentation. Edin and Ohlsson (1994) claims that only 
minority governments has more trend to grow huge deficits. On the other hand, 
Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) explore that during elections right wing government pay 
focus to fiscal stabilization. Alesina and Roubini (1997) found no evidence of higher 
deficit for left wing government. Colombo and Tirelli (2011) study a wider set of 
variables that simultaneously affect the GDP growth and the government spending 
.The collected works on the current issue suggests that more efforts are required to 
find out the sources of instability of budget deficit so it is better to resolve the issue 
if focus not only on economic variables but also to see the reality from political 
perspective.    
  
3.  Providing an Improved Methodological Framework and Data 
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The theoretical framework put forward the following empirical hypothesis that the 
economic and political instability is associated with budget deficit. So this section 
investigate whether or not this hypothesis is accepted by the empirical support. The 
current study start analysis by application of panel data models on equation 1 
presented below. The data covers for the low and high income countries ranging 
from 1984 to 2016 and the panel is unbalanced for estimation of budget deficit 
volatility. The current study is based on the theoretical work of Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) and Person and Tabellini (1997) and empirical work of Woo (2003) and 
Henisz (2004). These studies paid attention to the part of institutions which is 
important for proficient economic activity.The empirical specification in dynamic 
panel data models to identify the features defining the instability of budget deficit is 
specified below: 
 
itiititititit vCINSTECONBDVBDV i  +++++= −1                                    (1) 
 
In the above equation volatility of budget deficit for the country i for the period t is 
denoted by BDV, economic variables are denoted by ECONit , political and 
institutional variables are denoted by  INSTit ,and  control variables which record 
country special features Cit .The economic variables for the current study includes 
budget deficit which is used as a percentage of GDP, trade openness, per capita real 
GDP and inflation. The reason for the selection of real GDP per capita is to record 
the varying level of economic development among the countries. The population 
growth controls for the size of country effects.The explanatory variables that 
measure the effect of political instability are included as political stability, socio 
economic condition, investment profile, Internal conflict, external conflict, 
corruption, ethenic tension, democratic accountability, Bureaucracy quality, religion 
in politics, military in politics and law and order. The Current study is carried out for 
the sample of low and high income countries for the period 1984 to 2016 using the 
Fixed Effect and Random Effect Model. Finally to make a choice between fixed 
effects and random effects approach Hausman test is applied. The general 
econometric representation of the equation for the inclusion of theoretical variables 
is as follows: 
 
                                         (2) 
 
In the above equation volatility of budget deficit is shown by BDV. In this equation i 
represent country and time period denoted by t, as this is a panel data study. The 
Economic variables are denoted by ECONit. The political and institutional variables 
are denoted by INSTit and finally control variables which record country special 
features are denoted by Cit..The estimators of fixed effects are also identified as the 
estimator of least-squares dummy variables (LSDV). In this model each group 
comprises a separate dummy variable to have different constants for each group. A 
fixed effects model may be arrange as follows to combine effects which are 
particular to a country. 
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                                       (3) 
 
In the above equation:   is a country effects depending on time. There is another 
method to estimate the model namely random effects model. Random effect method 
holds the constants for each unit not as fixed but random parameter and this is the 
major differentiation of the two models.  
 
3.1 Data and Sample  
 
The current study has collected data for economic variables and political variables 
using panel data from 1984 to 2016 for low and high income countries .This study 
has taken sample of 30 low income 59 high income countries. The selection of 
sample depends upon the availability of data set. Economic variables are obtained 
through international financial statistics (IFS) and world development Indicators 
(WDI). The source of political variables is International Country Risk Data Guide 
(ICRG). The current study is using several economic variables like ratio of budget 
deficit to GDP, real GDP per capita, Trade openness and inflation. The reason 
behind to include inflation variable is to confirm the expected positive relationship 
between budget deficit and inflation. The ratio of trade to GDP represents trade 
openness and it captures the external shocks. The population growth is used as a 
control variable to capture the effect of country size of each country. The political 
variables such as government/Political stability, socio economic condition, 
investment profile, Internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, ethnic tension, 
democratic accountability, Bureaucracy quality, religion in politics, military in 
politics and law and order  are included to find out the impact of governmental 
uncertainty on budget deficit volatility. This study is using political index and it is 
provided by International country Risk Data Guide.In this index lower total risk is 
shown by high risk point and higher total risk is shown by lower risk point. 
 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
 
In this section we run panel regression for two group of countries. The groups are 
comparatively homogeneous regarding the structures and conditions of the 
economy. The grouping of countries into low and high income countries is done on 
the basis of definitions provided by World Bank. Low income group contains 
countries that are categorized as low income and Lower-middle income countries, 
on the basis of per capita income by World Bank. While high income group contains 
the countries that are categorized as high middle income and higher income 
countries, on the basis of per capita income by World Bank. This study has taken 
sample of 30 low income 59 high income countries. The selection of sample 
depends upon the availability of data set. The estimates of fixed and random effect 
for low income countries are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. 
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Table 1: Fixed effect for Low income countries 
 
The * indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% & ***indicates significant at 10%. 
 
The equation of fixed effect model for low income countries in the table:1 explain 
that Corruption, socioeconomic condition, political stability, Internal conflict and 
ethnic tension has strong association with budget deficit.  
 
Table 2: Random effect for Low income countries 
 
The * indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% & *** indicates significant at 10%. 
 
According to table: 1 budget deficit is positively and significantly associated with 
real GDP per capita(Wu, Feng and Li, 2015). This may be due to the developmental 
projects of the country, Fatas and Mihov(2006; 2010) and Woo (2003). The result 
shows that the budget volatility and population growth has a positive relationship. 
The equation of Random effect model for high income country in Table 2 has shown 
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that corruption, socio economic condition and external conflicts has a strong 
association with  budget deficit. The equation of random effect model for low 
income countries has shown Gdp per capita and inflation has positive association 
with budget deficit but it is not significant.The estimates of fixed and random effect 
for high income countries are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. The 
equation of fixed effect model for high income countries in the table:3 has shown 
that corruption, socio economic condition, political stability, military in politics, 
external conflicts, investment profile and  ethnic tension has strong negative 
association with budget deficit. 
 
Table 3:  Fixed effect for High income countries 
 
The * indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% & *** indicates significant at 10%. 
 
The estimates of fixed effect model for high income countries has shown that 
inflation and GDP per capita has a positive and significant association with budget 
deficit. The result shows that the budget volatility and population growth has a 
negative relationship. The results of fixed effect model show that trade openness 
have insignificant positive association with budget deficit(Agnello and Sausa ,2009 
and Fatas and Mahov, 2010). The equation of Random effect model for high income 
countries in table:4 has shown that socio economic condition, political 
stability,investment profile and ethnic tension has negative association with  budget 
deficit but it is not significant. The equation of random effect model for high income 
countries has shown GDP per capita is negatively and significantly associated with 
budget deficit. Trade openness has a positive and significant association with budget 
deficit. 
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Table 4: Random effect for High income countries 
 
The * indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5%, *** indicates significant at 10%. 
 
The Hausman test statistic for low income countries and high income countries are 
presented in table:5 to compare the results of fixed effect with the random effect. 
According to table:5 random effect is better for the low income countries. The fixed 
effect model is the best fit model for the high income countries as shown by the P 
value = 0.00. Hausman test statistic is very small so we can conclude the difference 
between the estimates is insignificant and use fixed effect model and reject the null 
hypothesis which represents consistency of random effect model. 
 
Table 5: Hausman Test Statistic 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The current study has a major objective to examine not only economic determinants 
of budget deficit but also to focus on political variables for Low income and high 
income countries of the world for 1984 to 2016.The current study concludes that 
corruption, conflicts and political stability are important indicators of budget deficit 
both for low and high income countries. According to present study institutional 
variables are very important determinants of budget deficit in the regions of low and 
high income countries. The outcome indicates that the budget is more stable with the 
higher level of political stability. The Budget deficit has more fluctuations if higher 
level of corruption coexists. So to avoid high and unstable deficit attention should be 
diverted to improve institutional setup of the economy. 
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